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Research has shown that there are potentially disastrous outcomes of human fatigue at
sea. The conditions in which the seafarers have to operate are becoming more and
more demanding. The study in this article attempts to aggregate accident charts derived
from in-depth studies of human fatigue-related accidents to determine common pat-
terns of interlinked fatigue factors. The accidents are analyzed by means of the
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), which in the article has
been modiﬁed for maritime accidents. The main fatigue factors identiﬁed are ‘shift
work’, ‘irregular working hours’, ‘inadequate task allocation’, and ‘excessive
demands’. The study reveals several differences between ship collision and grounding
accidents and their corresponding fatigue factors. Human fatigue-related collision
accidents are characterized by wrong/badly timed decisions, misconceptions, and
poor communication between the vessels. Right before the collision the crew is often
panicking and mistakes are easily made. In human fatigue-related groundings, the
conditions are often monotonous and the navigating ofﬁcer has either overlooked the
upcoming seabed or simply fallen asleep. Safety climate issues are also identiﬁed as
important contributors to human fatigue.
1. Introduction
Measuring safety performance has become increasingly important in many high-risk
industries, such as nuclear power, the chemical industry, the offshore oil and gas industry,
and air trafﬁc control. Much work has been done to study the factors that shape the safety
climate in these industries, but little research has focused on shipping (Hollnagel 2004;
Håvold and Nesset 2009).
Maritime transportation has a long history of accidents. The shipping industry has
spent a lot of resources on improving ship structures and the reliability of ship systems.
The ships today are technologically advanced and highly reliable (Rothblum et al. 2002;
Stoop 2003). Still, statistics are indicating that not only is the number of shipping
accidents increasing but also the reason may well be the advanced technology, as well
as human factors (Nilsson, Gärling, and Lützhöft 2009; Bambulyak and Frantzen 2011).
In Norwegian waters, at least 8 out of 88 groundings in 2006 were inﬂuenced by watch-
keepers falling asleep (Gould and Koefoed 2007). The conditions that the seafarers have
to operate in are becoming increasingly demanding. There are, for instance, shorter sea
passages, higher trafﬁc density coupled with reduced manning, and rapid crew turnaround
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(Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns 2006). In general, seafarers are reported to experience
more accidents than the onshore population (Roberts and Hansen 2002).
Surveys show that about 75–96% of marine casualties are fully or partially caused by
human and organizational errors (Ren et al. 2008). The technical systems are getting more
and more reliable (Arslan and Turan 2009). As a result, the number of accidents related to
human actions have risen from around 30 % in 1960–1980 to around 70–80% in the
1990s (Hollnagel 1998). Technical advances have also contributed to decreasing the
manning level. Today, a Very Large Crude Carrier may have a crew of 22 seafarers,
whereas 25 years ago a similar vessel would have been manned with a crew of in between
40 to 50 people. The reduced manning levels and improved automation systems have
revealed the underlying level of inﬂuence of human error in accident causations
(Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns 2006). The Marine Accident Investigation Branch
(MAIB) summarized the accident causes from 66 investigation reports. They concluded
that watchkeeper manning levels, human fatigue, and a master’s ability to discharge their
duties are major causal factors in ship collisions and groundings, and poor lookout is a
major factor in collisions (MAIB 2004).
The problem one faces when performing research on human fatigue is the lack of any
clearly deﬁned and agreed-upon deﬁnition. It is difﬁcult to compare research results since
the deﬁnitions of human fatigue (henceforth only denoted as fatigue) often are vague. There
is also a general agreement that any percentages based on accident data underestimate the
true magnitude of the problem, because of underreporting and not prioritizing the fatigue
problem (Williamson et al. 2011). In addition, conducting pure statistical analysis is
problematic due to underreporting of accidents in the maritime community and the poor
details in the various databases (Li and Wonham 2001; Hassel, Asbjørnslett, and Hole
2011). Fatigue is a multidimensional construct and its effects on cognitive performance are
complex. Thus, the true extent of fatigue in transportation is unclear and unknown.
The purpose of this article is to analyze maritime collision and grounding accidents to
identify human fatigue factors involved and their interconnections. An in-depth study
method called Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) is used and
modiﬁed to the maritime domain because it provides a systematic approach to classifying
fatigue factors and their relationship. The results are compared and validated with general
ﬁndings from the literature.
The analysis of maritime accidents may reveal valuable information regarding the impact
of fatigue on risk. In general, the literature on fatigue identiﬁes a number of fatigue factors,
but to prevent accidents one needs to understand their causes and how they come together to
create fatigue. To our knowledge, no studies have attempted to aggregate accident charts so
that common patterns of interlinked fatigue factors can be determined in the maritime
bridge’s navigational teams. Macrae (2009) successfully applied CREAM for maritime
accidents, but his focus was on human factors in general and not speciﬁcally on fatigue.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 1.1 explains fatigue
factors at sea and Section 1.2 discusses the various types of accident models available.
Section 2 presents the research method and the data material used in the study, Section 3
presents the accidents’ results, and Section 4 gives the conclusions.
1.1. Human fatigue factors
The abstractness and complexity of fatigue is the reason why the term fatigue factor is used in
this article, instead of, for example, fatigue causing factors or fatigue consequences. Fatigue
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factors are deﬁned as being physical or cognitive properties with interdependencies to fatigue.
The interdependencies mean that there is a unidirectional or bidirectional relationship
between fatigue and the fatigue factors so that the state of one fatigue factor is affected by
or correlated with the state of another fatigue factor, including fatigue itself. In other words,
the term ‘fatigue factor’ implies that there is a relationship between the fatigue factors or
between those factors and fatigue itself. There may even exist ‘loops’ in terms of one factor
inﬂuencing another factor, which again causes additional impact of the ﬁrst one.
Extensive literature exists on fatigue within the medical, transportation, and psychol-
ogy ﬁelds of research. Summed up, fatigue can be classiﬁed into physical and cognitive
(mental) categories. Mental fatigue is believed to be psychological in nature, whereas
physical fatigue is considered synonymous with muscle fatigue (Grandjean 1979; Lal and
Craig 2001). Both physical and mental fatigues cause decline in alertness, mental con-
centration, and motivation. The major symptom of mental fatigue is a general sensation of
weariness and disinclination for any kind of activity (ibid). The use of one’s focus shifts to
the tasks in the present or in the immediate future, and the more peripheral tasks and
warnings are overlooked (Lovell 1999). Operating at a very high level of concentration
combined with heavy workload over time can result in high levels of mental fatigue.
Fatigue was identiﬁed as an important contributor to maritime environmental disasters like
the Exxon Valdez and Peacock on Pipers Reef in Australia (Lovell 1999).
A suitable deﬁnition of fatigue in maritime working environments is ‘a biological drive
for recuperative rest’ (Desmond and Hancock 2001; Noy et al. 2011; Williamson et al.
2011). A broader deﬁnition of fatigue is ‘subjective experience of someone who is obliged
to continue working beyond the point at which they feel conﬁdent of performing a task
efﬁciently’ (Smith, Lane, and Bloor 2001). The latter deﬁnition is used in this study.
An important fatigue factor is the safety climate which reﬂects the attitudes, beliefs,
perception, and values that persons share in relation to safety at all levels of the
organization (Cooper 2000). Safety climate is the only one aspect of the safety culture
in an organization. Safety culture can be deﬁned as a constructed system of meaning
through which the hazards of the world are understood. (Pidgeon 1991). There is,
however, a lack of universal consensus regarding the term safety culture and safety
climate. Often the terms are used interchangeably in the literature (Health & Safety
Executive 2005). A useful framework was provided by Cooper (2000), where he deﬁnes
the safety culture as a set of attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior
in an organization which encompasses ‘how people feel’ about safety and safety manage-
ment systems. This feeling is the safety climate, which can be measured subjectively
through the use of, for example, questionnaires. These questionnaires uncover the atti-
tudes and perceptions of safety climate at a given point of time (Cooper 2000). The level
of employee empowerment, higher management involvement and interest, the rewarding
system, safety information, investment in safety, safety-oriented procedures, training, and
the reporting system all reﬂect safety climate onboard ships.
Management should frame the working environment so that safety is focused on at all
times. Tolerance of letting the employees get exhausted, overworked, or if task allocations
are not properly managed are indications that the safety climate is not of a high standard.
Higher fatigue levels are therefore assumed to be associated with less than adequate safety
climate. Further on, the safety culture, which inﬂuences the safety climate, is not only
about the management commitment to safety, its communication style, and the overt rules
of reporting errors but also about the employees’ motivation, morale, perception of errors,
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and attitudes toward management and factors that impact safety on board, such as fatigue
(Itoh, Andersen, and Seki 2004). Work environments in which differences are attempted
to be resolved with dialogue and discussions are least likely to report stress, poor general
health, exhaustion, or sickness absence (Hyde et al. 2006).
In general, safety culture in maritime transport can be grouped into three levels, of
which the third level is the highest. The ﬁrst level is a culture of punishment where the
essential theme is to identify and then frequently blame the last person in the chain. The
second level reﬂects a culture of compliance to external rules with no real commitment or
motivation from the organization itself. The third level is the culture of self-regulation
where the organization is continuously and actively seeking to improve safety and learn
from the mistakes made (Kristiansen 2001). In several studies (Havold 2000; Kristiansen
2001; Anderson et al. 2003), good communication between the personnel and manage-
ment, between persons onboard and onshore, and between the different departments of the
company has been recognized as a key success element in terms of a safety culture.
However, since the safety culture is not easily measured or assessed, we therefore limit
our attention to safety climate in this study.
Another fatigue factor is the sleep homeostatic effect (sleep deprived or time awake). It
must be accounted for when interpreting circadian (biological 24 hours rhythm) inﬂuences on
human performance (Williamson et al. 2011). Disruption in the circadian rhythm can upset
the body temperature, blood pressure, work performance, and sleep/wakefulness (Lal and
Craig 2001). At sea, noise, motion, vibration, fumes, and even the anticipation itself of getting
woken up frequently disturb rest periods. Studies suggest that there is higher accident risk at
times when human beings are normally asleep (Smith, Lane, and Bloor 2001).
Communication between seafarers, between vessels, and between ships and the vessel
trafﬁc services is also vulnerable to fatigue. Accurate communication skills are especially
important because of the many cultures and nationalities that work together (Macrae 2009;
Manuel 2011). This creates language barriers and can increase the stress level on board
(Rothblum et al. 2002). In a study dealing with the problems and practices of maritime
English usage, it was found that those with language problems had lower perceptions of
all aspects of life on board. The study suggested that it may be a result from increased
level of stress arising from communication problems (European Union-DG VII 1999).
In regard to falling asleep, humans can operate relatively unaffected by sleep distur-
bances when performing active tasks with low mental demands, but the opposite is not
true (Gould and Koefoed 2007). When the ships are in open waters with little or no trafﬁc,
the ofﬁcer in charge on a modern bridge with navigational equipment like GPS and
ECDIS only needs to monitor the ship’s location in relation to the passage plan, which is a
low mental activity. Nighttime, rolling movements, warm wheelhouse/bridge, solitude on
watch, and shortage of sleep can lead to the ofﬁcer falling asleep. In simple words,
automation could lead to lowering the probability of an accident, but coupled with a
perception of better control and the effect of behavioral adaption, for instance, lowered
alertness or an increase in risk-taking, automation may decrease the positive effects and
even reverse them (Elvik, Høye, and Sørensen 2009).
An extensive study published in 2006 by the Centre for Occupational and Health
Psychology in Cardiff concluded that the potential for fatigue at sea is high due to
seafarers’ exposure to a large number of recognizable risk factors, operational, organiza-
tional, and environmental (Smith, Allen, and Wadsworth 2006). Seafarers work in shift
patterns, which may contribute to fatigue and poorer health (Phillips and Sagberg 2010).
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Onshore studies show that working in excess of 50 hours per week increases occupational
stress (Smith, Lane, and Bloor 2001). Seafarers’ situation is that at least half of them work
more than 80 hours per week. In addition, noise, motion, vibration, fumes, and the
anticipation of getting woken up frequently disturb rest periods. In a self-reporting
study of sleep quality, 70% of the seafarers reported poor sleep at sea (ibid). The work
regulations limit the exposure somewhat, but do typically not take into account the
circadian rhythm, nor the rate of accumulation of sleep debt, the frequency of opportu-
nities for full recovery from sleep debt, and they do not take into consideration non-work-
related time (Gander et al. 2011).
A Swedish study on fatigue at work measured 30 participants in two different watch
systems: the two watch system 6 on/6 off and the three watch system 4 on/8 off (Lützhöft
et al. 2007). The participants answered a questionnaire measuring health. The participants
also underwent medical tests like measuring activity and reaction time. The main result,
although not statistically signiﬁcant, was that there seemed to be a higher level of fatigue
among the workers in the two-watch shift system. Another multipartner research study
(Horizon 2012) was conducted aiming to investigate the impact of watchkeeping patterns
on the cognitive performance of seafarers. Among other things, the study used simulators
to investigate the effects of the 6 on/6 off and 4 on/8 off watch system. In total a total of
87 men and three women participated. On the whole, the former watch system had a
higher fatigue (sleepiness) levels than the latter. Further on, the sleepiness levels also was
found to have a peak between 0400 and 0800 hours.
It is also important to note that boredom, which is not classiﬁed as a type of fatigue,
can lead to feelings of weariness and sleepiness, decreased vigilance, and disinclination
for tasks involved, and decline in alertness. Boredom is caused by low level of stimula-
tion, by a regular repetition of identical stimuli, or by having few mental or physical
demands (Grandjean 1979). However, in practice it is hard to distinguish boredom from
fatigue caused by, for instance, long hours of monotonous work. Fatigue can be seen as a
transitory period between awake and asleep and if uninterrupted by recovery, it can lead to
sleep (Lal and Craig 2001). Below is a short summary list of the main fatigue factors
generally identiﬁed in the literature:
● Company culture and management style
● Sleep and rest
● Quantity and quality of sleep/rest
● Biological clock and circadian rhythm
● Monotony and boredom
● Level of automation
● Indoor environment on bridge (comfortable chairs, temperature, noise, etc)
● Shift work and work schedules
1.2. Accident models
An accident can be deﬁned as a sudden, unwanted, and unplanned event or event
sequence that leads to harm to people, the environment, or other assets (Rausand 2011).
Accidents in complex socio-technological systems rarely happen because of a single
unexpected event or a single failure. Even an unexpected event may not be unwanted.
Some unexpected events are labelled ‘good fortunes’, while other events less fortunate are
called ‘near misses’ or ‘mishaps’. More serious events are called incidents, accidents, and
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disasters. In brief, to be able to call an event an accident, it has to be unexpected and have
an unwanted outcome (Hollnagel 2004).
Accident models try to explain why accidents happen and causality is an important
concept. In general, there are three main paradigms accident models can be grouped into
sequential, epidemiological, and systemic accident models. The understanding of the
various accident models is important for choosing the right method to analyze an abstract
phenomenon like fatigue among the navigating crew of a ship.
The sequential models are the earliest and simplest accident models (Kjellén 2000).
The accident is described as a result of events occurring in a speciﬁc order, sequential in
time. An early example is the Domino theory (Heinrich 1959). In the domino theory
model, a link in the chain is an unsafe act or unsafe condition, and by preventing it, the
accident is avoided. Event tree analysis is a technique which is suitable for Domino-based
methods. However, an accident at sea is rarely the result of a single event; rather it may be
a product of a long chain of events and rare events occurring together.
The sequential models were early criticized for being too simple, and the possibility
to work with multiple causality was limited (Hollnagel 2004; Reinach and Viale
2006). Sequential models imply that there is one single main cause in the beginning
of the sequential chain, called the root cause. However, the analysis can always be
taken one or more steps further back in search of a new root cause. The sequential
models have therefore introduced certain stop rules, which are more or less subjective
and made dependent on constraints of time and resources. The whole concept of one
single root cause is therefore misleading and should be used with care (Grifﬁth and
Mahadevan 2011).
The second-generation accident models, often termed ‘epidemiological’ models,
had their analogy with the spreading of a disease, that is, that the outcome was a
result of a combination of factors, some manifest and some latent that happen to exist
together in space and time. Examples of epidemiological models are the Swiss cheese
model (Reason 1990) and models of sharp end–blunt end interaction (Woods et al.
1994). In the epidemiological models, the search is for latent failure conditions. The
investigators are not to look for only one main root cause. The models admit the
complexity and the fact that the analysis must account for complex interactions among
different factors. Yet the epidemiological models are still sequential in their core; they
follow a sequence of events from a beginning to an end in the direction of causality
(Nygren 2006).
The systemic accident model takes into account the socio-technological system that
shapes the conditions for the people and equipment performance rather than only focusing
on human or mechanical error (Flohberger 2010). The Functional Resonance Accident
Model (FRAM) is an example of a systemic model. FRAM shows how the various
functions of a system’s component may resonate and create hazards that can run out of
control. In systemic models, the whole system is looked at as one entity, not as being
made up of several components (Hollnagel 2004). Accidents happen when the system’s
ability to control the events no longer is sufﬁcient. The systematic models have their
origin in control theory, chaos theory, and the idea of stochastic resonance.
Epidemiological or systemic accident models should be used when analyzing systems
involving human actions. Sequential models may still be used where simple machines are
involved. However, human actions and organizational factors require more comprehensive
modelling.
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2. Methodology and material
2.1. The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM)
CREAM was developed by Erik Hollnagel (1998) for the analysis of safety related errors
in socio-technological systems to determine the human, technological, and organizational
factors that may be involved in error causation (Akhtar et al. 2010). CREAM has been
based on the principles of cognitive system engineering. It was originally developed for
the nuclear power industry, but is a generic technique which can be used in various areas
involving complex and dynamic systems. In-depth case studies, like maritime accident
investigation reports provide detailed data that are otherwise unattainable from statistics.
The main purpose of converting case studies (i.e., the accident investigation reports) into
CREAM charts that are aggregated is to identify common patterns which in turn give birth
to various hypotheses and relationship theories. The patterns are possible to identify
because the charts are consistent and because the classiﬁcation schemes compel the
analyst to think through the accident in the same systematic way for each case.
Even though CREAM generates accident charts in a timeline, its underlying model and
technique is not sequential. CREAM is therefore claimed by some to be a systemic
method because of its non-linear reasoning (Hollnagel 2004; Qureshi 2008). However,
the end result of a CREAM analysis, that is, the aggregated charts, points to cause–effect
relationships because of the timeline involved, and thus, it could also be argued that
CREAM is not fully systemic. Still, the method produces valuable insights into the system
being studied.
For road trafﬁc accident analysis the Driving Reliability and Error Analysis Method
(DREAM) has been developed, which is basically an adapted version of CREAM (Warner
et al. 2008). There are many parallels between road trafﬁc accidents and maritime
accidents; however, the maritime accidents are more complex in their human cognitive
nature. There are also stronger inﬂuences of organizational and technological factors
compared to road trafﬁc accidents where the driver is often the only human being in
charge. In maritime accidents there may be complex interactions between the bridge’s
team members. Human performance over time, as required on a ship’s bridge, usually
demands great cognitive effort, including sustained vigilance, selective attention, complex
decision-making, and automatized perceptual skills. In light of these cognitive elements
and the research literature on fatigue, CREAM was selected as a suitable method for
analyzing the interaction of the fatigue factors and human performance on a ship’s bridge.
The approach in CREAM requires three necessary parts: a model, a classiﬁcation
scheme, and a classiﬁcation method (Sandin 2008). Figure 1 shows how CREAM can
be used as a tool to generalize causes and relationships from maritime accidents.
CREAM has a comprehensive classiﬁcation scheme for accidents. The classiﬁcation
scheme groups and classiﬁes the actions, causes, and the outcomes of events. The biggest
distinction is made between the effects/manifestations which are termed phenotypes and
the causes termed genotypes. Phenotypes refer to observable effects, that is, human
(observable) actions, as well as system events, such as release of matter and changes in
speed, direction etc. The genotypes (the non-observables) can be classiﬁed into three
groups: man, technology, and organization. The challenge with a classiﬁcation scheme
(taxonomy) is that it must contain a large number of details to be useful. On the other
hand, if the taxonomy is too detailed, the number of categories becomes too large, making
it difﬁcult to classify events. In addition, each category becomes too narrow in scope.
Therefore, the taxonomy is seen as a ﬂexible tool which needs to be renewed and updated
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regularly (Sandin 2008). CREAM does not deﬁne the factors in the taxonomy in detail
(see Table 1). It is up to the analyst to make use of them as he or she interprets them. A
relatively high degree of subjectivity is therefore involved in the analysis of each accident.
However, when several charts are combined (aggregated charts), the method yields
common patterns which are interpreted as disclosing cause–effect relationships. The
degree of subjectivity is further lowered if the same accidents are analyzed by different
persons in teamwork or individually. CREAM’s taxonomy is not organized in a strict
hierarchical way; thus, several pathways can lead to any particular consequence. A
genotype coming before another genotype in one accident chart can well change places
in another accident chart. Therefore, in accordance with the systemic view, the single
accidents charts created are not considered to be causation charts, as is the case with
sequential models; rather they should be interpreted as signifying relationships and
interactions between the various factors.
The ﬂexible way of organizing the taxonomy is important in order to model complex
socio-technological systems. The results are highly dependent on the structure of the
taxonomy and one may therefore question the objectivity of the CREAM taxonomy.
However, even with a non-linear taxonomy and high reliance on the analyst, the
CREAM results are shown to be reproducible by other researchers.
To strengthen the validity of research using CREAM, the aggregation charts may be
conducted by a different set of researchers than the individual accidents charts. Double set
of researchers may work as a quality check of the total analysis. To validate a version of
CREAM developed for road accidents (DREAM), a study was done on how different
researchers understand and use the taxonomy for same accident (Sandin 2008). The
Case files 
Accident charts 
Common patterns? 
Hypotheses of 
general causes and 
relationships 
Figure 1. Aggregated causation charts are based on case studies from in-depth accident
investigations. The dotted rectangle indicates CREAM’s application area (Sandin (2008)).
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results showed that on average 83% genotypes and 78% of the phenotypes were identical.
Although DREAM is different from CREAM the methodology and the technique for
analyzing the accidents are the same. The CREAM taxonomy was originally designed for
the nuclear power industry. When analyzing fatigue-related maritime accidents with
CREAM, the challenge is to translate the event of accident, including the fatigue factors,
into genotypes found in the CREAM taxonomy. Table 1 contains explanations of the
CREAM genotypes, for brevity only those genotypes are listed which were picked at least
ﬁve times or more during the analysis of the accidents in the current study.
Summing up CREAM, when analyzing an event or accident one must ﬁnd suitable
genotypes in the taxonomy to choose from. Each of these genotypes is then looked up in the
taxonomy which guides in ﬁnding further suitable matches (genotypes) until the taxonomy
options are exhausted. We have used CREAM to search for interdependencies and common
conditions that can be associated with fatigue-related accidents. The CREAM version 0.6.1 was
used which can be downloaded directly from the internet (CREAM v.0.6.1 2012). For further
reading about CREAM, we refer to (Hollnagel 1998, 2004; Sandin 2008).
2.2. Fatigue-related maritime accidents
The accidents in the present study were collected from 98 collision/contact accidents and
56 groundings from the MAIB in the UK (MAIB 2004). In addition, 22 maritime accident
reports from the Accident Investigation Board Norway were included. From all of these
accident investigation reports, 33 fatigue-related accidents were identiﬁed: 16 collisions
and 17 groundings from 1999 to 2011. If the accident investigation report explicitly
suspected fatigue at the time of the accident, or two or more of the fatigue factors
described in Section 1.1 were judged to be present, the accident was regarded as being
Table 1. Explanations of CREAM genotypes adopted from (Hollnagel 1998).
Genotype Explanation
Wrong direction Movement in the wrong direction or the wrong kind of movement of the
vessel.
Timing An action started too early or too late (delayed action).
Observation missed A signal or an event that should have been the start of an action is missed.
Inattention/distraction The performance of a task is not completed because of a shift in attention
or an event was missed due to inattention that can be explained by
cognitive function.
Fatigue/performance
variability
The person’s response and precision of actions are reduced due to fatigue.
Communication failure Movement in the wrong direction or the wrong kind of movement of the
vessel.
Inadequate procedure An action started too early or too late (delayed action).
Inadequate plan A signal or an event that should have been the start of an action is missed.
Irregular working hours The performance of a task is not completed because of a shift in attention
or an event was missed due to inattention that can be explained by
cognitive function.
Inadequate quality control The person’s response and precision of actions are reduced due to fatigue.
Shift work Movement in the wrong direction or the wrong kind of movement of the
vessel.
Inadequate task allocation An action started too early or too late (delayed action).
Excessive demands A signal or an event that should have been the start of an action is missed.
Source: (Sandin 2008).
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fatigue related. Consequently, all of the accidents in our sample were assumed to involve
fatigue. The accidents were not limited to any speciﬁc ship type; however, vessels with at
least four crewmembers were included so that the interaction and communication between
the personnel could be taken into account when analyzing fatigue. See Annex 1 for a
detailed overview of the accidents included in the current study.
2.3. Classiﬁcation and aggregation of CREAM charts
Each individual fatigue-related maritime accident was classiﬁed by means of CREAM
version 0.1.6 (CREAM v.0.6.1 2012). In order to identify patterns of genotypes and links,
the CREAM charts for the collision and grounding accidents were ﬁrst aggregated as two
separate groups. Then, all charts were aggregated together in order to view the overall
picture and identify differences and/or similarities between the charts from the collision
and grounding accidents.
CREAM aggregation charts point out the factors most often occurring and identify
interdependencies and common conditions that can be associated together. The CREAM
taxonomy is somewhat limited so several factors are commonly interlinked. Aggregation
charts space out these interlinks. In the charts, the accident is placed to the right and then
the factors closest to it in the timeline are placed to its left side. Thus, causation can be
inferred. However, as mentioned in Section 1.2, in accordance with the systemic view, a
line in the chart should be interpreted with care, even though causation can be inferred,
they primarily signify relationships and interactions between the various factors. Straight
lines are therefore used instead of arrows to indicate this fact. For instance, in Figure 2,
‘observation missed’ can be inferred as being the effect or consequence of ‘fatigue’.
However, the aggregation of the CREAM charts in our analysis places ‘observation
missed’ closer to the accident, thus indicating it to be a cause of fatigue.
3. Results
3.1. Collision accidents
Figure 2 illustrates the aggregation of the collision accidents. Collision is deﬁned here as
two vessels unintentionally being in physical contact with each other. In the collision
accidents, ‘observations missed’ was tightly linked to ‘fatigue’. Fatigue also inﬂuenced
‘timing’ which in a turn led to a collision. Examples of bad timing include initiating a turn
too late or misjudging the other vessel’s speed.
‘Communication failure’ and especially ‘irregular working hours’ are also tightly
linked to ‘fatigue’. In the accidents examined, there was often no communication between
the personnel on board. Even when other members of the bridge team noticed too high
speed or a turn not being conducted properly, there was a lack of whistle blowers.
Communication often initiated when it was already too late, and when the environment
got panicky and mistakes easily were made. ‘Communication failure’ may be a cause or
an effect of fatigue, but is in either way linked to ‘fatigue’. Even though CREAM’s
taxonomy places one genotype before the other, the interpretation of the CREAM
diagrams is that there is a connection between these two genotypes which one should
be aware of. In light of the systemic view, as discussed above, one should be careful to
determine a genotype as an absolute cause or an effect to another genotype. However,
CREAM does point out patterns in accidents from which typical inﬂuences of the various
genotypes are highlighted. ‘Irregular working hours’ is used when the personnel had to
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work whenever they were needed even outside their watch. ‘Irregular working hours’ is
linked with ‘shift work’ and ‘bad allocation of the tasks’, like for instance, sending the
lookout to do lower priority work and leaving the ofﬁcer alone in the bridge. The masters,
for instance, frequently worked outside their shifts when the ship was on harbor loading
and unloading and when the ship was navigating out from the port.
The aggregation shows that ‘Communication failure’ is linked with ‘inadequate pro-
cedures’. The interpretation of this must be that ‘inadequate procedures’ may lead to
communication failures and not the other way around. In one accident, for example, the
pilot was busy ﬁnding the right radio channel to communicate with the other vessel
instead of maneuvering the vessel by sight even when the collision had become imminent.
Inadequate or misguided communication and planning between the boarding pilot and the
master is another example. When the pilot is navigating the vessel, the master is still the
main responsible person on board and should therefore be critical to the pilot’s choices
and ask questions. Ideally the master and the pilot should cooperate in navigating the
vessel. However, the master often goes into a passive state, not adjusting the orders of the
pilot when it is obviously evident to do so (Lovell 1999).
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Figure 2. Aggregation of CREAM accident charts of fatigue-related collisions. The sum
denotes the frequency of the factors in the accidents.
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Finally, two collision accidents resulted from the ofﬁcer falling asleep and in one of
them the ofﬁcer was under the inﬂuence of alcohol. However, no genotypes were
available in our CREAM version to include ‘asleep’ or ‘alcohol abuse’ in our analysis.
3.2. Groundings
Figure 3 illustrates the aggregation of the grounding accidents. Grounding is deﬁned here
as the vessel’s impact on the seabed causing damage to the hull; 17 accidents were
classiﬁed as groundings.
The main ﬁnding is that ‘fatigue’, ‘inattention’, and ‘inadequate procedure’ together
inﬂuence ‘observation missed’ which in turn lead to groundings. Shallow waters or
submerged rocks were overlooked even if they were clearly marked on the radar screens
and charts.
Fatigue is linked to ‘excessive demands’ and ‘irregular working hours’. ‘Inadequate
procedures’ are tightly linked with ‘inadequate quality control’. ‘Inadequate procedure’
includes incomplete, or in some cases, total lack of the navigational planning. In three
accidents the navigational equipment was not working properly.
In general, groundings occurred when the vessel for some reason missed a turn. The
overwhelming majority (14 accidents) had ‘wrong direction’ (i.e., the maneuver is made
in the wrong direction) as the direct reason for grounding, as shown in Figure 3.
Although not managed by the CREAM taxonomy, the high levels of inattention and
fatigue may be related to the time pressure the bridge personnel are exposed to. Often,
passage planning is absent because it is actively omitted, especially by masters and pilots
who feel familiar with port approaches. Still, poor planning alone is often not enough to
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Figure 3. Aggregation of CREAM accident charts of fatigue-related groundings. The sum
denotes the frequency of the factors in the accidents.
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lead to grounding, but coupled with fatigue, inattention, and omitting passage plan may
turn out to be crucial.
3.3. The overall picture
Figure 4 illustrates the aggregation of both collision and grounding accidents (note that
only genotypes with frequency ﬁve or higher are included to emphasize the patterns). In
general, ‘observation missed’ and ‘timing’ are closely related to ‘fatigue’. ‘Fatigue’ is
mostly linked to three genotypes: ‘excessive demands’, ‘irregular working hours’, and
‘Observation missed’. ‘Irregular working hours’ is closely linked to ‘shift work’ and
‘inadequate task allocation’; 27 out of 33 accidents had irregular working hour schemes
for the personnel. ‘Communication failure’ is not directly connected to ‘fatigue’, but it is
however noticeably present and contributes to ‘observation missed’.
In 22 accidents the navigating ofﬁcer did not use a ‘lookout’. Lookout duties are easily
given a lower priority to other waiting tasks like maintenance, catching up with sleep, etc.
Lookout duties are also thought of as unnecessary redundancy, especially when the trafﬁc is
low. When fatigued, the risk of missing observations increases when the lookout is omitted or
assigned other tasks (MAIB 2004). A strong and direct link between ‘fatigue’ and ‘inadequate
procedures’ was not found, even though they both inﬂuenced ‘observation missed’.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of a genotype being included in the analysis. The blue
columns represent the collision accidents and the red columns represent the grounding
accidents. It is clear that some genotypes are overrepresented in grounding while others are
overrepresented in collision. ‘Observation missed’ and ‘excessive demands’ stand out in
grounding accidents, while ‘communication failure’ seems to be central in collision accidents.
Figure 6 shows the circumstances at the time of the accident. In about 21% of all the
accidents the navigating ofﬁcer was under the inﬂuence of alcohol, and in about 40% of
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Figure 4. Aggregation of CREAM accident charts of fatigue-related collision and groundings.
The sum denotes the frequency of the factor.
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the accidents the ofﬁcer had fallen asleep. As previously mentioned, misuse of alcohol
and drugs could unfortunately not be included in the analysis as no genotypes are
available from the CREAM taxonomy.
The circadian effect also seems important: all groundings, with the exception of one,
happened between 22–02 hours (4 accidents) and 02–07 hours (12 accidents). Collisions, on
the other hand, mostly occurred during the daytime and in the evening. The lack of lookout was
high in both collision and grounding accidents. Studies show somewhat different results on
exactly when the risk of collisions is at its highest between 0600 and 0700 (Folkard 1997), and
Figure 5. Frequently used causal factors from the CREAM taxonomy for the 33 fatigue-
related accidents.
Figure 6. Various circumstances in the 33 fatigue-related accidents in the study.
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in general, collision accidents are associated with the start of a shift. The collisions between
ships at sea are more likely to occur during the early hours of the day, and while they are under
way, that is, when the crew is ﬁnished with anchoring or berthing, but when they have not yet
reached open waters (Smith, Lane, and Bloor 2001).
Figure 7 illustrates the sea state at the time of accident. The majority of accidents
happened when the sea state and the visibility were considered relatively good. One
ofﬁcer fell asleep in moderate sea when the vessels were subject to waves, while all other
similar accidents happened in calm–smooth or slight sea state. Apart from one accident,
the visibility levels were good when the ofﬁcers fell asleep. This seems to support the
theory that monotonous weather conditions, coupled with fatigue can lead to reduced
vigilance and sleep, as discussed by (Allen, Wadsworth, and Smith 2008; Williamson
et al. 2011; Phillips and Sagberg 2010).
The age of the ships was not a signiﬁcant factor in the accidents. The average age of
the ship in the collision accident was 14.3 years and 17 years old for groundings. The
ships were all well equipped with the necessary navigational instruments. Man–machine
interface problems when fatigued were generally not mentioned in the accident investiga-
tion reports.
A particular hazardous situation is when circadian and sleep homeostasis is coupled
with alcohol and monotonous conditions. Even low alcohol exposure signiﬁcantly impairs
the performance of maritime pilots (Howland et al. 2001). A period of sustained wakeful-
ness of 18 hours can be comparable to a Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) of 0.05%. If
sleep deprivation continues for 24 hours, the effect of fatigue is equal to a BAC level of
0.10%. Use of alcohol also signiﬁcantly impairs the visual search and the solving of
navigational problems (Marsden and Leach 2000). Prolonged watches in combination
with abuse of alcohol are a major cause to fatigue-related accidents (IMO 2001). Almost
35% of the grounding accidents analyzed in our study involved alcohol abuse.
Figure 7. Sea state level and visibility level ratios at the time of accident. The sea states
indicate the wave lengths in meters at sea (Douglas sea scale). The deﬁnition of the range of the
visibility is from (Pick (1932)).
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The above ﬁndings indicate that fatigue in grounding accidents is different from fatigue
in collision accidents. The groundings were less complex accidents than collisions. In
groundings, the bridge team either had an ofﬁcer asleep or missed vital observations,
which eventually led to grounding of the vessel. In collisions, the events had several
aspects and were more complicated to analyze in CREAM. More genotypes had to be
chosen from the taxonomy for collision accidents than groundings in order to describe the
accident in a satisfactory manner.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The study in this article reveals several differences between collision and groundings
accidents and their corresponding fatigue factors. The general nature of collisions is that
the vessels spot each other, but badly timed decisions are made and misconceptions are
formed due to fatigue. Right before the collision the atmosphere is often panicking and
mistakes are easily made. Genotypes like ‘communication failure’, ‘inadequate plan’, and
‘inadequate procedure’ play a bigger role in collisions than in groundings.
A typical grounding accident in the present study happened in monotonous conditions,
with good visibility and calm sea, the navigating ofﬁcer being fatigued and therefore
missing vital observations or badly timing a turn. The fatigue might be generated from
poor organizational culture.
‘Communication failure’ was an important element in both types of accidents. Bad
communication indicates a poor safety climate where team support and whistle blowing
are not encouraged. Several collisions could have been avoided if the whole team was
actively involved instead of being spectators to the master’s or to the embarking pilot’s
actions. Pilots had most of the time written passage plans brought with them to the bridge,
but they were not discussed with the rest of the crew. In practice they were only superﬁcial
plans. However, this practice was seemed to be accepted from both parties: the master and
the pilot.
In the overall picture (groundings and collisions), fatigue is tightly coupled with
‘observation missed’ which in turn leads to ‘wrong direction’. Other genotypes were
‘shift work’, ‘inadequate task allocation’, ‘irregular working hours’, and ‘excessive
demands’. All of these latter-mentioned genotypes point to a deteriorated safety climate,
with a high tolerance for long hours of work. More alarmingly the poor safety climate did
not seem to be limited to the shipping companies. Also, the attitudes of the embarking
pilots toward safety issues were surprisingly poor. Good communication is essential for a
healthy safety climate. The present study suggests that lack of communication seems to be
one of the main problems in the collision accidents. The communication between the
pilot, the master, and the rest of the team was often at the bare minimum.
In the accidents examined, it can be concluded that the core of the ISM Code (IMO
2010) was not followed, which is to constantly be thinking about safety and recognizing
that accidents are preventable through following correct procedures and established best
practices, like having a proper lookout which is well rested and motivated for the job.
Overall, there was also a lack of human resources, time pressure, and relatively frequent
staff turnover in the bridge’s navigational team. This makes it difﬁcult to implement a
good safety management system.
Even though CREAM is generic, it was originally not developed for maritime acci-
dents, and as such, it does not include all the fatigue factors which are generally
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recognized as being important for the bridge management team at sea, for instance
‘homeostatic sleep’ or ‘circadian effect’.
The actual links between the genotypes in the taxonomy are not well documented
in CREAM. Thus, even though the results call attention to important fatigue factors
and the interaction between them, one cannot say that the results are derived inde-
pendently from CREAM. In theory, other methods may therefore highlight other
fatigue factors and their interdependencies. Still, the existing taxonomy in CREAM,
even if not precisely deﬁned and accounted for, is built up of well-recognized
elements in cognitive engineering adaption and adjustments of the taxonomy is
encouraged. Therefore, the CREAM taxonomy can and should be adjusted to better
suit maritime accidents. In the maritime version, the genotypes could be further
categorized and more precisely deﬁned. ‘Irregular working hours’, for instance,
could be divided into three more factors like ‘shift work scheme 4–8–4’, ‘6–6’, or
‘12–12’. We have already seen one example in our study of how the taxonomy needs
to be adjusted. All of the 17 groundings were fatigue related; hence, we know that
fatigue was an element in all of the groundings. Nevertheless, fatigue was only picked
as a genotype 16 times. This is because in one grounding accident, the genotypes were
chosen in such an order that fatigue never showed up as an available genotype to
choose from in the taxonomy. Use of drugs and abuse of alcohol could not be
included either.
In the present form of CREAM, the taxonomy does not include the possibility of
choosing genotypes for incorrect use of the various maritime navigational equipment
available on the ship’s bridge. Other fatigue factors, like those mentioned in the IMO
fatigue guidance manual (IMO 2001), should also be integrated in an upgraded CREAM
version for maritime accidents. Examples are frequency of port calls, time between ports,
weather conditions, ship design, and location of quarters. By doing so, one could go a step
further in the analysis and deﬁne more genotypes, such as vessel’s maintenance, the
automation level, the number of different nationalities on board, poor bridge design, etc.
An attempt was made in a master thesis (Nygren 2006); however, a more profound and
documented work is needed for research work.
A possible weakness of the current study is that the same researchers were used to
produce the individual accident charts and the aggregated charts. A different set of
researchers for the aggregation charts may have worked as an extra quality assurance.
However, this may be an important point to consider whether the charts become more
extensive and complicated. In this study the aggregations were considered to be straight-
forward and not wide-ranging.
In-depth analysis has the privilege to go deep into each accident and look for
explanations. However, the maritime industry should pay attention to the lack of consis-
tencies in the accident reports. Even within the same accident investigation organization,
the reports do not follow one single template, making it difﬁcult to draw statistics without
including subjective interpretations. The accidents analyzed in this study are purposely
fatigue related. General conclusions must therefore be drawn with care. Nevertheless, a
vital lesson learned from this study is that more effort is needed to improve the knowledge
of how fatigue factors contribute to accidents.
Macrae (2009) showed in his study, focusing on human factors in general, that
‘planning’, ‘interpretation’, ‘communication failure’, and ‘team work’ were the major
grounding accident contributing genotypes. For collision accidents ‘inadequate plan’,
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‘missed observation’, and ‘poor interpretation’ were the main accident contributing
genotypes. Our aggregation charts, derived from fatigue-related accidents, highlight
slightly different genotypes. For groundings ‘inattention’, ‘inadequate procedures’, and
‘observation missed’, and for collisions ‘communication failure’, ‘inadequate procedures’,
and ‘observation missed’, were the major contributing genotypes. This indicates that
fatigue inﬂuences the human cognitive processes in such a way that speciﬁc precaution
and measures should be prioritized and applied when fatigue could be in the picture. The
bridge team should be trained to recognize and admit fatigue and exercise caution related
to the fatigue factors discovered in our study.
Accident analysis implies use of theoretical accident models. Most of them are not ﬁt
to model complex phenomena; they simulate sequential chains which assume little or no
interaction between the various chains of events leading to an accident. In complex socio-
technical systems one needs models which can take into account the complexity and the
correlations between the various causal chains. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) are able
to deal with this complexity (Rausand 2011), but they require an underlying theoretical
accident model to build upon. In-depth analysis of accidents using CREAM can assist in
identifying and arranging the fatigue factors to be used in building a BBN network.
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Annex 1
Name of the vessel
Place of
accident Report
Year of the
accident
Accident
type
1 Pride of Canterbury England MAIB report nr 2/2009 2008 Grounding
2 Kivalina Norway AIBN report nr:9 205 885 2008 Grounding
3 Antari Ireland MAIB report nr 7/2009 2008 Grounding
4 Aqua -boy Scotland MAIB report nr 14/2007 2006 Grounding
5 Harvest Caroline Scotland MAIB report nr 13/2007 2006 Grounding
6 Kathrin England MAIB report nr 24/2006 2006 Grounding
7 Berit Denmark MAIB report nr 17/2006 2006 Grounding
8 Lerrix Germany MAIB report nr 14/2006 2005 Grounding
9 Jackie Moon Scotland MAIB report nr 5/2005 2004 Grounding
10 Jambo Scotland MAIB report nr 27/2003 2003 Grounding
11 Nedlloyd Mangellan England MAIB report nr 18/2002 2001 Grounding
12 Brothers England MAIB report nr 1/2007 2006 Grounding
13 Primrose Scotland MAIB report nr 13/2002 2001 Grounding
14 Resplendent Shetland MAIB report nr 10/2002 2001 Grounding
15 Lomur Shetland MAIB report nr 7/2002 2001 Grounding
16 Betty James Scotland MAIB report nr 34/2002 2000 Grounding
17 Choise England MAIB report nr 33/2002 2001 Grounding
1 Boxford England MAIB report nr 17/2011 2011 Collision
2 Skagern England MAIB report nr 6/2007 2006 Collision
3 Samskip Courier England MAIB report nr 6/2007 2006 Collision
4 Maritime Lady Germany MAIB report nr 2/2007 2005 Collision
5 Lykes Voyager Hong Kong MAIB report nr 4/2006 2005 Collision
6 Orade England MAIB report nr 23/2005 2005 Collision
7 Hyundai Dominion China MAIB report nr 17/2005 2004 Collision
8 Sky Hope China MAIB report nr 17/2005 2004 Collision
9 Dorthe Dalsoe Sweden MAIB report nr 10/2005 2004 Collision
10 Saint Jacques II Germany MAIB report nr 5/2002 2002 Collision
15 Celtic King Wales MAIB report nr 2/2001 2001 Collision
11 Atlantic Marmaid Germany MAIB report nr 12/2002 2001 Collision
12 Highland Pioneer England MAIB report nr 15/2001 2001 Collision
13 De Bounty Wales MAIB report nr 2/2001 2000 Collision
14 Bruce Stone England MAIB report nr 31/2001 2000 Collision
16 Dole America England MAIB report nr 32/2000 1999 Collision
MAIB: Marine Accident Investigation Branch. Website: www.maib.gov.uk
AIBN: Accident Investigation Board Norway. Website: www.aibn.no
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